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Background: Previous research has indicated that disordered gamblers display deficits 
in impulsivity and risky decision-making, compared to healthy control groups. However, 
disordered gamblers are not a homogenous group, and differences in performance on 
neurocognitive tasks may be related to the form of gambling in which an individual chooses 
to engage. The present study used neurocognitive tasks and questionnaire measures to 
ascertain group differences in gamblers grouped by preferred form of gambling.
Method: Treatment-seeking pathological gamblers from the National Problem Gambling 
Clinic, London (n = 101), completed a neurocognitive assessment comprising the 
Cambridge gamble task (CGT), the stop-signal task (SST), a probabilistic reversal learning 
task (PRL), and the Kirby Monetary Choice Questionnaire, as well as questionnaire 
measures of gambling severity, impulsivity, depression, and anxiety. Analyses compared 
gamblers who favored fixed-odds betting terminals (FOBTs) (the modal form) to gamblers 
who preferred other forms of gambling (non-FOBT).
Results: The FOBT group showed impaired decision-making under risk on the CGT 
compared to the non-FOBT group, choosing the likely option less on more uncertain 
decisions. The FOBT group made fewer perseverative errors on the PRL task, had lower 
depression and anxiety scores, and were less likely to have a family history of problem 
gambling than the non-FOBT group.
Discussion: Decision-making and cognitive flexibility differences between gamblers 
grouped by gambling type supports preferred form as an important source of heterogeneity 
in gambling disorder. Decision-making strategies and risk attitudes should be considered 
when approaching cognition-focused treatment strategies, allowing interventions to be 
targeted at specific cognitive deficits.
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INTRODUCTION
Pathological gambling was re-classified from an impulse control 
disorder to an addictive disorder in the most recent versions of 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-
5) (1) and the International Classification of Diseases and Related 
Health Problems (11th edition) (ICD-11) (2) in acknowledgement 
of the parallels between behavioral and substance addictions (3). 
The term “disordered gambling” is used hereafter as an umbrella 
term for people experiencing gambling-related harm.
Disruption of executive functions has been identified as being 
important in the development and maintenance of addictive 
behaviors (4). More specifically, risky decision-making and 
low self-control (i.e., impulsivity) are markers that cut across 
different forms of addiction, through the interaction of impulsive 
and reflective systems for assessing reward options (5, 6). As in 
substance addictions, groups of pathological gamblers display 
statistically significant impairments in decision-making using 
the Iowa gambling task (IGT), selecting more cards from the 
disadvantageous decks (7). Pathological gamblers also show 
deficits in risky decision-making using the Cambridge gamble 
task (CGT) (8, 9), the Information Sampling Test (IST) (8), and 
the game of dice task (10). Brevers et al. (11) found that problem 
gamblers perform worse than controls on tasks assessing 
decision-making under both explicit risk (where the odds are 
known) and decisions under ambiguity (where the probabilities 
are unknown).
Similarly, impulsivity has been seen to be elevated in both 
substance addictions (12) and disordered gambling (13). 
Impulsivity can be measured with delay discounting tasks (i.e., 
impulsive choice) (14–16) as well as tests of response inhibition 
(i.e., impulsive action) on tasks including the stop-signal task (17), 
the Go–No Go task (18), and the Stroop test (19). Additionally, 
disordered gamblers display increased response perseveration 
and compulsivity on reversal learning tasks (20), although Boog 
et al. (21) suggest these deficits may arise as a function of reward 
motivation rather than cognitive inflexibility per se. Nevertheless, 
the multi-dimensional nature of impulsivity has not been fully 
parsed in disordered gambling. Using a thorough assessment 
with both neurocognitive tasks and questionnaire measures, 
Billieux et al. found that disordered gamblers exhibited higher 
urgency, lower premeditation, impairment in prepotent 
inhibition, and lower tolerance of delayed rewards than a control 
group. However, they also observed considerable heterogeneity 
in the impulsivity profiles of the gamblers: although disordered 
gamblers reported elevated impulsivity at an overall level, 
individual gamblers displayed atypical scores on different 
UPPS subscales, and the disordered gamblers were not reliably 
impaired across all inhibition tasks, indicating that impulsivity is 
not universally present in disordered gamblers (22).
In comparing problem gamblers to healthy controls, an 
alcohol dependent group and a Tourette syndrome group on 
four impulsivity-related dimensions (self-reported impulsivity, 
prepotent response impulsivity, choice impulsivity, and motor 
impulsivity), Kräplin et al., (23) found that gamblers were 
more impulsive than the healthy control group across all 
dimensions, and the problem gamblers were the only group that 
differed on choice impulsivity, indicating some dimensions of 
impulsivity although a key feature in gambling disorders, are not 
disorder specific (23).
Traditional models of sub-typing problem gamblers 
primarily rely on personality traits and clinical characteristics 
(24–26). Three dominant subtypes of gambler are proposed, 
termed “behaviorally conditioned,” “emotionally vulnerable,” 
and “antisocial impulsivist,” with impulsivity emphasized as a 
dispositional factor in the third pathway. However, approaches 
to subtyping gamblers to date have rarely consider the form(s) 
of gambling the individual engages in. The level of skill, or 
strategy involved in different forms of gambling, can vary: 
lotteries are chance games, where no single outcome is more 
likely than any other, whereas gambling forms such as poker 
offer far greater potential for experienced players to develop 
successful strategies (27). Studies that utilize preferred form as a 
source of heterogeneity commonly use a dichotomy of strategic 
(e.g., sports, cards) versus non-strategic (e.g., slots, lotteries) 
games, describing differences in demographic variables (28–30), 
personality traits (31), and gambling severity (32).
Preferred form of gambling has also been investigated 
preliminarily in relation to neurocognitive performance. 
After characterizing group deficits in pathological gamblers 
on the IGT and a reversal learning task, Goudriaan et al. 
(33) separated gamblers based on their preferred forms (slot 
machine gamblers and casino gamblers); the slot machine 
gamblers displayed greater impairments in decision-making 
than the casino gamblers. Using a computational model to 
decompose performance on the IGT, Lorains et al. (34) found 
that strategic gamblers were significantly influenced by both 
gains and losses but demonstrated an inconsistent choice 
style, where non-strategic gamblers were less sensitive to 
losses and exhibited poor learning during decision-making. 
Navas et al. identified non-strategic gamblers displayed higher 
delay discounting whereas strategic gamblers reported higher 
cognitive distortions and self-reported reward sensitivity (35). 
However, in a study by Grant et al. (36), both strategic and 
non-strategic gamblers were impaired compared to healthy 
controls on tests of cognitive flexibility or motor impulsivity, 
but the subgroups did not differ from each other.
In the UK, fixed-odds betting terminals (FOBTs) are a form 
of electronic gaming machine (EGM) located in high-street 
betting shops and casinos. These terminals offer multiple games 
with “fixed odds,” including electronic roulette as a popular form. 
FOBTs appear to be a particularly problematic form of gambling. 
Disordered gamblers are estimated to account for over 22% of 
money and over 25% of time spent on FOBTs in the UK (37). 
In a small sample of treatment-seeking pathological gamblers 
from the London National Problem Gambling Clinic, FOBTs 
were the preferred form of gambling in 60% of the sample (16). 
Subsequent analyses found that FOBT preference is associated 
with increased gambling severity (38), and that use of “gaming 
machines” was a significant predictor of pre-treatment dropout 
(39). Furthermore, in data collected from gamblers seeking 
residential treatment in the UK, FOBTs were the most common 
and fastest increasing form of gambling identified by those clients 
as problematic (40).
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Recent meta-analyses have confirmed robust differences 
on neurocognitive tasks in groups with disordered gambling 
compared to healthy comparison groups (7, 13, 20, 41). The 
present study focuses specifically on disordered gamblers, by 
exploring heterogeneity on neurocognitive and questionnaire 
measures of impulsivity and risky choice. A moderately 
large sample of treatment-seeking pathological gamblers 
were grouped as a function of preferred form of gambling, 
distinguishing FOBTs as the modal form against a non-FOBT 
group comprising all other preferred forms. Considering 
the heterogeneity in previous studies explained by strategic 
vs. non-strategic form preferences, we predicted that FOBT 
preferences would also predict neurocognitive performance.
METHODS
Participants
Treatment-seeking pathological gamblers were recruited from the 
National Problem Gambling Clinic, London (NPGC). Inclusion 
criteria were a current diagnosis of pathological gambling using 
the Massachusetts Gambling Screen (MAGS) (42), a 12-item 
gambling screen based on the DSM-IV pathological gambling 
criteria. This was corroborated by scores indicating problem 
gambling on the Problem Gambling Severity Index (PGSI >  7) 
(43). Exclusion criteria were the presence of neurological 
disorders, previous serious head injury or history of psychotic 
disorder, leading to exclusion of nine participants. This resulted 
in a final sample of 101 pathological gamblers (92 male; age M = 
37.6, SD = 11.3).
The study protocol was approved by Cambridge South 
Research Ethics Council, Ref: 09/H0305/77. Participants gave 
written informed consent in accordance with the Declaration 
of Helsinki and were reimbursed for time and travel expenses. 
Participants completed a general screening questionnaire to 
collate demographic data including age, gender, nationality, 
ethnicity, education level, employment status, relationship 
status, and handedness. This questionnaire recorded 
participants’ preferred form of gambling, and family history of 
disordered gambling.
Participants were grouped based on their stated preferred 
form of gambling. The modal preferred form was FOBTs in 
43 participants (age M = 36.9, SD = 11.7, 41 male). Other 
forms (n  = 58; age M = 38.1, SD = 11; 51 male) comprised 
sports betting (n = 14), fruit machines (n = 13), betting on 
horses (n = 10), poker (n = 6), casinos (n = 6), blackjack (n 
= 4), online casinos (n = 2), stocks and shares (n = 2), and 
betting shops (n  = 1). Smoking status was measured by the 
Fagerstrom Test for Nicotine Dependence (FTND) (44). IQ 
estimates were obtained from two measures, the National 
Adult Reading Test (NART) (45) and the composite of the 
Matrix Reasoning and Vocabulary tests on the Wechsler 
Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (46). All participants were 
recruited following initial assessment at the NPGC and were 
either awaiting treatment (FOBT n = 27; non-FOBT n = 38), 
receiving psychological treatment (FOBT n = 11; non-FOBT 
n = 14), or had completed a course of CBT (FOBT n  =  5; 
Non-FOBT n = 6). Groups did not differ on treatment stage 
distributions (χ² (2) = .33, p = .85).
Neurocognitive Assessment
Kirby Monetary Choice Questionnaire (Kirby MCQ) (44)
Delay discounting was measured using the Kirby MCQ (47), a 
temporal discounting task involving 27 binary choices between 
an immediate smaller reward versus a larger reward available 
following a delay. All rewards were hypothetical monetary 
rewards. Larger rewards varied across three levels of magnitude 
(low, medium, and high). The indifference points at each 
magnitude are used to derive a hyperbolic k value, where higher 
k values indicate steeper discounting of delayed rewards and thus 
higher impulsivity. k Values are log transformed to reduce skew 
and averaged over the three magnitudes to calculate the overall 
discounting rate.
Cambridge Gamble Task (CGT) (45)
Risky decision-making was examined using the Cambridge 
gamble task (48). On each trial, 10 boxes are presented that are 
colored red or blue. The ratio of colors varies from trial to trial 
(9:1, 8:2, 7:3, and 6:4). The participant is instructed that a token 
has been hidden under one box. Each trial involves two responses. 
First, the participant makes a decision regarding which box color 
the token is hidden, and second, they place a bet of some points 
on their color choice. Across two conditions (in counterbalanced 
order), bets are offered in either an ascending or descending 
sequence, in fixed proportions of the current tally (5, 25, 50, 
75, and 95%). Participants complete four blocks of nine trials in 
each of two conditions; at the start of each block the participant 
is endowed with 100 points. Key measures were proportion of 
choice of most likely outcome, deliberation time, and proportion 
of points bet.
Stop-Signal Task (SST) (46)
Response inhibition was measured using the stop-signal task 
(49). This is a two-choice response task, where participants are 
presented with a “Go” stimulus that requires a rapid response 
(left response key for an arrow pointing left, and right response 
key for an arrow pointing right). Participants were instructed to 
inhibit the Go response if an auditory stop signal was presented 
(a 300-Hz tone). These stop signals occurred on 25% of trials, a 
short delay after the Go stimulus. This delay was adjusted over 
successive stop trials using a staircase procedure, to identify a 
point at which the participant successfully inhibited on 50% of 
stop trials. The task contained five blocks of 64 trials, resulting 
in 80 stop trials over the task. Key measures were the median Go 
reaction time and the stop-signal reaction time.
Probabilistic Reversal Learning Task (PRL) (47)
Perseverative responding was measured with a probabilistic reversal 
learning task (50). This is a two-choice visual discrimination, with a 
red and a green stimulus randomly displayed in two of four screen 
locations. Selection of one stimulus is positively reinforced on 80% of 
trials (by the word “CORRECT” appearing on the screen); the other 
stimulus is incorrect (“WRONG”) on 80% of trials. After 40 trials 
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for learning the initial discrimination, the contingencies reverse for 
40 trials, such that the previously incorrect stimulus is now correct 
on 80% of selections. Key measures are the number of errors made 
in the two stages, the number of consecutive errors following the 
reversal (i.e., perseveration), and the number of response switches 
following the misleading (probabilistic) feedback.
Self-Report Measures
Anxiety was measured using the Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI) 
(51), a 21-item questionnaire measuring anxiety symptoms in 
the past month on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 3 (severely). Scores 
of less than 21 indicated low anxiety, scores of 21–35 indicate 
moderate anxiety, and scores of ≥36 indicated severe anxiety. 
Depression was measured using the Beck Depression Inventory 
II (BDI-II, 52), a 21-item scale with scores ranging from 0 to 3. A 
total BDI-II score of 0–13 indicated minimal depression, scores 
of 14–19 indicate mild depression, 20–28 indicate moderate 
depression, and scores of 29–63 indicate severe depression. 
Impulsivity was measured using the UPPS-S (53), a 59-item self-
report scale designed to measure five subscales of impulsivity. 
Items are answered on a Likert scale, anchored at 1 (agree strongly) 
to 4 (disagree strongly). The five subscales are negative urgency, 
positive urgency, (lack of) planning, (lack of) perseveration, and 
sensation seeking. Gambling cognitions were measured using 
the Gambling-Related Cognitions Scale (GRCS) (54), a 23-item 
scale where items are presented as statements, and participants 
are required to respond on a Likert scale anchored at 1 (strongly 
disagree) and 7 (strongly agree). The GRCS can be divided in to 
subscales of inability to stop (five items), interpretative bias (four 
items), illusion of control (four items), gambling expectancies 
(four items), and predictive control (six items).
Data Analysis
The neurocognitive tests that involved repeated-measures factors 
(Kirby MCQ: reward magnitude; CGT: color ratio and ascend/
descend condition; PRL: stage) were analyzed with a mixed-
factorial ANOVA with group as the between-subject factor. Post 
hoc analysis utilized t tests where appropriate. All data were 
checked for homogeneity of variance, and Greenhouse–Geisser 
was corrected where p > .05. Group differences on the scores on 
the questionnaire measures between the FOBT and non-FOBT 
gambling groups were analyzed using independent samples t 
tests. Chi-squared analyses were used for categorical data. Error 
bars represent the standard error of the mean. Data from the 
Kirby MCQ was log transformed prior to analysis.
RESULTS
The two subgroups did not differ significantly on age, gambling 
severity [(MAGS, (42); PGSI, (43))], IQ estimates, or nicotine 
dependence (Table 1). Although the non-FOBT group showed a 
trend toward having a greater proportion of females, the groups 
did not differ significantly on gender distribution (χ² (1) = 3.15, 
p = .06). The non-FOBT group (38.6%) were more likely to have a 
family history of problem gambling than the FOBT group (23.8%; 
χ²(1) = 5.21, p = .02). The FOBT group scored significantly lower 
than the non-FOBT group on the BDI (t (99) = 2.16, p = .03) and 
BAI (t (97) = 2.87, p = .005). Groups did not differ on scores on 
any of the UPPS-P or GRCS subscales (Table 2).
Kirby MCQ: The ANOVA indicated a significant main effect 
of magnitude (F(1.8,173) = 52.91, p < .001), such that the k values 
were lower for delayed rewards of larger absolute magnitude, with 
significant differences between each of the three levels (lowest t = 
5.43, all tests p < .001). The main effect of group (F(1,94) = .043, 
p  = .84) and the magnitude x group interaction (F(1.8,173)  = 
.051, p = .94) were not significant.
Cambridge Gamble Task: On quality of decision-making, 
the ANOVA for proportion of trials on which the participant 
chose the more likely option showed a significant ratio x group 
interaction (F(1.6,121.4) = 4.78, p = .016), as well as significant 
main effects of ratio (F(1.6,121.4) = 43.84, p < .001) and group 
(F(1,76) = 9.1, p = .003). The FOBT group were less likely to 
choose the favorable option, and especially so at the more 
uncertain box ratios (6:4 ratio: t (56.8) = 2.84, p = .006; 7:3 t 
(52.8) = 2.13, p = .05). The 8:2 and 9:1 ratios were non-significant 
(lowest t = 1.47, p > .05), Figure 1.
An equivalent model for deliberation times indicated a 
significant ratio x group interaction (F(2.7,247.7) = 3.86, p = .02). 
The non-FOBT group demonstrated the expected pattern of 
longer deliberation times when the box color ratio was more 
evenly distributed (e.g., 6:4), than when the odds were greater 
(e.g., 9:1). The FOBT group demonstrated the opposite pattern, 
but analysis of simple effects indicated that the two groups did 
not differ significantly at any individual ratio (lowest t = .29, all 
TABLE 1 | Group differences.
Questionnaire/test Group Test statistics
FOBT (n = 43) Non-FOBT
(n = 58)
T df p
Mean Sd Mean Sd
Age 36.86 11.73 38.1 11 0.55 99 0.59
FTND 44 .77 1.86 1.46 2.46 1.59 98 0.11
MAGS 42 7.19 2.04 7.21 1.5 0.06 73.4 0.96
PGSI 43 18.59 4.5 19.16 4.4 0.63 96 0.53
NART 45 115.7 6.54 116.13 6.58 0.30 92 0.76
WASI 46 103.7 17.4 106.3 13.34 0.81 72.1 0.42
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p > .05). Main factors of ratio (F(2.7,247.7) = .88, p = .44) and 
group (F(1,93) = .243, p = .62) were not significant (Figure 2).
For the analysis of betting behavior, the model shows 
significant main effects for ratio (F(1.6,150.3) = 256.6, p < .001) 
and condition (F(1,93) = 129.4, p < .001). The ratio x condition 
interaction was also significant (F(2.1,194) = 8.04, p < .001). 
Both groups bet more points in the descending condition than 
the ascending condition across all ratios. The main effect of 
group and the condition x group, ratio x group, and condition x 
group x ratio interactions were all non-significant (Figure 3). The 
number of “bankruptcies” (i.e., losing all points within a block, 
t  (96) = .15, p = .88) and total points accrued across all trials 
(t (96) = .06, p = .95) did not differ between groups.
Stop-Signal Task: The groups did not differ on the stop-signal 
reaction time (FOBT M = 142.99ms, SD = 47.88; non-FOBT 
M = 131.86ms, SD = 41.21; t (80) = 1.13, p = .26). The median 
reaction time on “Go” trials did not differ between groups (FOBT: 
M = 469.93ms, SD = 113.91, non-FOBT M = 444.59ms, SD = 105.73; 
t (80) = .92, p = .36) indicating the groups did not differ in overall 
reaction time to go trials. In accordance with the SSD adjustment 
TABLE 2 | Questionnaire measures.
Questionnaire/test Group Test statistics
FOBT (n = 43) Non-FOBT (n = 58) t df P
Mean Sd Mean Sd
GRCS
Gambling experiences 12.79 6.17 13.6 7 .61 99 .55
Illusion of control 9.6 5.51 7.84 4.89 1.69 99 .09
Predictive control 17.67 8.53 15.16 7.39 1.59 99 .12
Inability to stop 18.98 7.69 18.79 8.11 .12 99 .91
Interpretive bias 15.26 6.21 15.52 6.79 .2 99 .84
Beck Depression Inventory 17.51 10.1 21.86 9.86 2.16 98 0.03*
Beck Anxiety Inventory 11.19 8.88 17.37 11.68 2.87 97 0.005*
UPPS-P
Positive urgency 33.74 9.17 34.4 9.62 0.35 98 0.73
Negative urgency 34.91 5.74 36.05 6.23 0.94 98 0.35
Lack of perseverance 22.88 4.74 23.67 5.54 0.74 98 0.46
Lack of premeditation 26 5.31 26.91 5.5 0.83 98 0.41
Sensation seeking 34.81 8.08 32.04 7.5 1.77 98 0.08
Kirby MCQ (ln k)
Magnitude—small −3.46 1.31 −3.48 1.27 0.1 94 0.92
Magnitude—medium −3.9 1.27 −3.98 1.26 0.32 94 0.75
Magnitude—large −4.4 1.5 −4.44 1.32 0.16 94 0.88
FIGURE 1 | Likely outcome choice as a function of ratio. FIGURE 2 | Deliberation time as a function of ratio.
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procedure, the proportion of successful stop inhibitions was close to 
50% and not significantly different between groups (FOBT M = .51, 
SD = .06; non-FOBT M = .51, SD = .06; t (80) = .095, p = .92).
Probabilistic Reversal Learning: The ANOVA for errors by stage 
indicated a significant main effect of stage (F(1,87) = 36.63, p < 
.001), with both groups making more errors in stage 2 (Figure 4). 
The main effect of group (F(1,87) = 1.08, p = .30) and the stage x 
group interaction (F(1,87) = 1.57, p = .21) were non-significant. 
However, the groups differed significantly on perseverative 
errors specifically (t (85.9) = 2.27, p = .03); the non-FOBT group 
perseverated longer following the reversal switch (M = 5.43, 
SD = 4.8) than the FOBT group (M = 3.39, SD = 2.9) (Figure 5). 
The groups did not differ on the number of times they switched 
choice following misleading feedback (t (87) = .60, p = .55).
DISCUSSION
The key aim of this study was to explore the heterogeneity 
within a group of pathological gamblers using a psychological 
assessment focused on neurocognitive measures of decision-
making, and questionnaire measures of impulsivity and common 
clinical comorbidities. Due the consistently high prevalence of 
FOBT gambling in UK treatment-seeking samples (including 
the present sample), our analyses compared FOBT gamblers 
against a mixed group of non-FOBT-preferring gamblers. The 
groups were comparable in terms of demographics and gambling 
severity. Analysis indicated both cognitive strengths and 
weaknesses in the FOBT gamblers. On the Cambridge gamble 
task, the FOBT group made fewer “rational” choices (i.e., of the 
majority color) on decisions with more uncertain odds. However, 
on the probabilistic reversal learning task, the FOBT group 
demonstrated lower levels of perseveration, potentially indicative 
of enhanced cognitive flexibility following the rule switch.
The CGT is a test of decision-making under risk (the odds 
are explicit) rather than under ambiguity. In prior research, 
individuals with pathological gambling differed from healthy 
comparison groups in terms of elevated betting and poorer 
quality of decision-making (8, 23). In the present study, the FOBT 
and non-FOBT groups did not differ in betting as a measure of 
impulsive and risky decision-making. However, differences were 
observed on decision quality, measured by the proportion of trials 
where the participant chooses the more likely outcome. Choice 
was also highly sensitive to the box ratio, with a stepwise increase 
FIGURE 3 | Proportion of points bet as a function of ratio.
FIGURE 4 | PRL errors by task stage.
FIGURE 5 | Perseveration and switching by group.
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in advantageous decisions as the ratios became more certain. The 
FOBT group made a lower proportion of advantageous choices, 
and this difference was strongest at the 6:4 and 7:3 ratios, where the 
outcomes were most uncertain. This choice of the unlikely option 
could be linked to the “gambler’s fallacy” (55), a classic cognitive 
distortion in which gamblers expect the opposite outcome to the 
recent sequence. On the CGT, if the token has appeared several 
times under the more likely color, a participant may feel that 
the unlikely option is “due” and opt against the rational choice. 
Indeed, this type of gambling distortion is prevalent in roulette, 
where tables often display history information regarding “hot” 
and “cold” numbers and colors to emphasize the recent history. 
FOBT players may therefore be more susceptible to gambler’s 
fallacy-type risky decisions.
Deliberation times to the CGT color choices also differed by 
preferred form, as an interaction with box ratio. The non-FOBT 
group showed the expected pattern whereby deliberation times 
became faster as the decisions became more certain (i.e., toward 
the 9:1 ratio). The FOBT group demonstrated the opposite 
pattern, with a trend toward longer deliberation at the more 
certain (9:1) color ratios. Notably, the two groups did not differ 
significantly at any individual box ratio. This pattern could also 
be explained by the conflict invoked by cognitive distortions such 
as the gambler’s fallacy at the most certain ratios. Anticipatory 
regret may be a further influence on these decisions. Regret is a 
powerful emotion associated with counterfactual thinking (“what 
might have been”) (56), and regret may increase if people do 
not win in a situation where they can easily imagine themselves 
winning (57)—for example, when choosing the majority color 
on the CGT. The pattern of decision latencies in the FOBT group 
supports the notion that probability is not the sole factor driving 
their color choice. This may be further expounded by gamblers 
who exhibit deficient emotion regulation (58).
The probabilistic reversal learning task showed that both 
groups made more errors in the second stage of the task, 
indicating increased perseveration and cognitive inflexibility. 
However, the results demonstrate a difference in perseveration 
between the two groups following the rule switch; the non-FOBT 
group perseverated significantly more than the FOBT group, 
demonstrating lower cognitive flexibility. The higher cognitive 
flexibility demonstrated by the FOBT group could be reflective 
of the cognitions associated with the different forms of gambling; 
the non-FOBT group contained a large number of sports and 
fruit machine gamblers, forms of gambling that either have 
relatively long outcome resolution (sports), or do not require any 
variation in the gambling mechanism (fruit machines), therefore 
do not require a great deal of quick-fire “switching” between 
win opportunities. Roulette on an FOBT requires the gambler 
to process the outcome in a number of different ways (color, 
odd/even, row, etc.) and then assimilate this outcome in to the 
decision-making process for subsequent bets, which on an FOBT 
can occur within 20 s. The continual updating of information 
requires cognitive flexibility. However, it is unclear from the 
current study whether a gambler with increased cognitive 
flexibility is drawn to FOBT machines or develops this capacity 
through persistent play on the terminals.
Using the Kirby Delay Discounting, both groups discounted 
smaller rewards more steeply than larger rewards, replicating 
impulsive behavior as previously demonstrated by Petry (14), 
Dixon et al. (15), and Michalczuk et al. (16). However, the 
two groups did not demonstrate any significant difference on 
discounting rates. The stop-signal task also failed to identify any 
group differences.
Strengths and Limitations
The current study chose to focus on the heterogeneity within 
pathological gamblers by classifying gamblers based on 
their preferred form of gambling, similar to Petry (32) and 
Goudriaan et al. (33). Although electronic roulette and other 
games available on FOBTs are primarily non-strategic forms, 
gamblers often believe they have a strategy, or a winning 
formula, and will therefore often erroneously believe there 
are elements of skill in chance games (e.g., fruit machines) 
(59). This complicates the traditional strategic/non-strategic 
dichotomy used by Grant et al. (36) and others, as some 
gamblers will likely play non-strategic games in a strategic 
manner. In addition, the strategic/non-strategic dichotomy 
can be dominated by certain specific games, such as Navas 
et al. (35) whose “type II non-strategic gamblers” were 
almost exclusively slot machine gamblers. However, for the 
classification used in the present study, it should be noted that 
EGM gamblers are present in both subgroups, given that FOBTs 
and slot machines are both types of EGMs. These forms do 
differ by gambling environment: FOBTs are housed specifically 
in gambling facilities (bookmaker’s shops) while slot machines 
are also available in non-gambling venues such as pubs. The 
influence of these environmental factors on the cognitive 
differences we have observed is unclear and warrants further 
investigation. Furthermore, our method for categorizing 
gamblers was based on their stated single preferred form, but it 
is acknowledged that many participants also engaged in other 
forms of gambling.
Although the two groups did not differ on gender distribution, 
the sample was heavily male dominated (nine females), which 
prevented analyses of gender within the gambling subgroups. 
Our sample was treatment seeking with some variability in 
relation to stage of treatment (waiting list, during treatment or 
post-treatment). Our results may not be generalizable to the 
larger numbers of “at risk” gamblers. Therefore, results should 
be interpreted with caution. Additionally, this study did not have 
a non-gambling control group; differences in neurocognitive 
performance between gamblers and non-gamblers are well 
documented; the aim of this study was to better understand 
heterogeneity within gamblers who identify different forms as 
problematic.
Results indicate cognitive differences between pathological 
gamblers grouped by preferred form, indicating that problem 
gamblers are a heterogeneous group. This result should be 
considered when comparing gamblers as a single group to control 
groups, as the preferred form distribution of the gamblers could 
influence results.
Heterogeneity in Disordered GamblingSharman et al.
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